As is well known, the two diplomats met 14 times between June 1998 and September 2000. The outcome of this dialogue unquestionably created the foundation for the strategic agreement that ultimately was achieved by the Bush administration through Condoleezza Rice and Nicholas Burns, and whatever might follow under the aegis of Hillary Clinton and the Obama administration.
But contrary to the conventional assumptions about why the Talbott-Singh dialogue achieved what it did (that there was a profound meeting of minds and sentiments between the two men), the actual reason was because India had neither signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) nor ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
Had it been otherwise, Talbott by his own admission, in his book ('Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and The Bomb'), concedes that the US probably would not have been able to achieve any treaty arrangement which allowed India to retain a nuclear weapons capability on the terms it sought for itself. This is because the non-proliferation constraints inherent in these treaties, combined with the influence of the non-proliferation lobby in the United States, would have prevented it.
Quite apart from the technical issues, Talbott admits that had the NPT and CTBT been in effect under US and international law, he himself would have insisted on an agreement between the two countries dependent on India's conformity to the letter of the treaties' non-proliferation strictures. He was not in his heart personally favourably disposed towards India achieving the special status it sought and obtained through some sort of agreement.
In the actual circumstances, therefore, Talbott bowed to a kind of ad hoc pragmatism, partially at least because: 'Jaswant Singh achieved more of his objectives than I achieved of mine.' It was, in other words, because Jaswant Singh proved to be a highly, skilled and ethical negotiator who convinced Talbott that any agreement that could be had would have to be based on allowing India to retain her weapons capability and re-processing rights, and trusting that India would be a morally responsible nuclear state despite the misgivings of the orthodox non-proliferation community.
So now Hillary Clinton and President Obama are the legatees of this somewhat arcane process which led to the US-Indian Strategic Agreement which entitles India to remain a respectable nuclear power in the eyes of the international community, buttressed with an array of special ties to America. Secretary Clinton and India's External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna issued a joint statement in which they 'agreed to strengthen the existing bilateral relationships and mechanisms for cooperation...'
What remains questionable is how harmoniously this relationship will endure when the differences in perspective between the new administration and its predecessor surface on the critical issues of non-proliferation and global climate change. In the words of Strobe Talbott: 'Mr. Obama... is committed to ratifying the CTBT, strengthening the NPT, and pursuing other treaties to prevent the spread of dangerous material and technology.'
Should this happen, the zone of ambiguity which benefitted the Talbott-Singh dialogue will disappear, which will pave the way for the re-entry of the non-proliferation hardliners back into the fray, and lead to US-Indian relations, including the strategic agreement, relapsing back into 'estrangement'.
Since Obama also favours replacement of the Kyoto protocol with 'a treaty-based climate-control regime including India, China and other emerging powers', this could become another area of stress and tension down the road.
Should this happen, it remains to be seen if the now substantial Indian-American community would become a new variable in mediating and ameliorating differences between the two countries.
But whatever happens, it must be realised that the last 20 years of Camelot might be facing some serious challenges.
(Harold Gould is a visiting scholar in the Centre for South Asian Studies at the University of Virginia. He can be contacted at Harold.Gould4@verizon.net)